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I. INTRODUCTION
A landlord in Farmers Branch, Texas agrees to meet with prospective
renters interested in leasing an apartment. After agreeing to show them
the apartment, the landlord meets the prospective renters for the first
time. The interested renters may be of Latin American descent, or, at
least, this is what the landlord believes based upon their physical traits.
Perhaps, the landlord believes this because of their skin color, hair color,
or eye color. The hint of an accent gives the landlord some indication
that the prospective renters are not native English speakers.
After being shown the apartment, the prospective renters express in-
terest in renting it, and the landlord asks for documentation proving their
immigration status as either citizens or lawful permanent residents. The
landlord is specific in his request for "original documents of eligible citi-
zenship or immigration status."1 The landlord knows he should ask for
documentation of immigration status from all interested parties looking
to rent an apartment, but he does not always ask. He believes these rent-
ers, however, warrant special attention. After all, they do not seem to be
Americans. Whether, in his history as lessor and apartment manager, the
landlord would typically request such documentation is irrelevant. On
this particular day and with these prospective renters, the landlord is
merely doing what he is supposed to do-follow the law.
1. See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), invalidated by Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/farmersbranch-ordinance.pdf (requiring local
landlords to rent only to tenants who can establish lawful immigration status).
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This hypothetical scenario is not unimaginable and certainly not unique
to Farmers Branch, Texas.2 Cities across the country, including, but not
limited to, Farmers Branch, Texas;3 Hazleton, Pennsylvania;4 Escondido,
California;5 Cherokee County, Georgia;6 and Valley Park, Missouri,7 as
well as more than one hundred other communities, have passed ordi-
nances that mandate that landlords and apartment managers verify the
immigration status of all prospective renters.8 The adoption and effective
implementation of rental ordinances, otherwise known as rental bans,
stem from cities' claims of authorized police power.9 The alleged purpose
behind rental bans is protection of communities, as certain cities maintain
that rental bans are implemented to "promote the public health, safety,
and general welfare of the public.""t Cities that pass rental ban ordi-
nances do not merely require landlords and apartment managers to en-
force these bans out of courtesy and respect for the protection of
residents, but rather landlords who violate ordinances are often subject to
prosecution."
2. See Associated Press, Texas City Faces Lawsuit over Rental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2008, at A18, available at 2008 WLNR 17574669 (describing MALDEF's and ACLU's
joint lawsuit against Farmers Branch).
3. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006).
4. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), invalidated by Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332 (M.D. Pa. 2006), enforced, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa.
2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordiance.pdf.
5. Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), invalidated by Garrett v. City
of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
immigrants/escondido-ordinance.pdf.
6. Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://
www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/cherokeecountyordinance.pdf.
7. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/immigrants/valleypark-amendedordinance.pdf.
8. See Dianne Solis & Stephanie Sandoval, Pennsylvania Ruling May Jeopardize FB
Rental Ban, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2007, at 1A, available at 2007 WLNR
14446376 (describing ordinances in Hazleton and Farmers Branch).
9. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757,
761 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (exploring the reasons for a city rental ban). The City of Farmers
Branch argued that the federal requirement of proving U.S. citizenship or valid immigra-
tion status in order to rent would also benefit the city by safeguarding the public. Id. The
court observed the city's frustration with the federal government for not regulating immi-
gration for various reasons, such as lack of resources and manpower. Id. at 763. Further-
more, the court pointed out that, notwithstanding the will of the people to overwhelmingly
support this ordinance, the ordinance cannot be enforced if it runs counter to the Constitu-
tion. Id.
10. Id.
11. E.g., id. at 763 ("[A]ny person violating.., the provisions of this ordinance shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction ... shall be fined in a sum not to
exceed [five hundred dollars] and a separate offense shall be deemed committed upon each
day during or on which [a] violation occurs or continues.").
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Recent lawsuits in Farmers Branch, Texas and Hazleton, Pennsylvania
are, arguably, just the beginning of litigation on this issue.12 Though
courts have issued injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the Farmers
Branch and Hazleton ordinances,13 cities continue to perfect their ap-
peals and crusade for the necessity of rental bans up to the highest courts.
Cities will continue to draft rental bans and other similar laws because
"the unhappiness of American citizens with their government's failure to
enforce immigration laws, and the resulting pressure on their elected offi-
cials to do something, is not going away." 14 In spite of recent judicial
decisions precluding some cities from continuing enforcement of rental
ban ordinances, cities, municipalities, and states "will continue to exercise
their authority to act in this field [of immigration reform], absent a
sweeping enactment by Congress to preempt such state laws and erase
existing federal statutes that invite states to act."" Recent litigation has
primarily focused on the constitutional rights of individuals affected by
the adoption and implementation of rental bans, as well as the impor-
tance of cities' blatant disregard of federal immigration laws.
16
12. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-85 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(holding that Hazleton's rental ban should be blocked); Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 763 (invalidating the Farmers Branch rental ban).
13. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 554; Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
14. Jan C. Ting, The Case for Immigration Law Enforcement in the United States and
in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 17 WIDENER L.J. 383, 390 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also
Gaiutra Bahadur, In Riverside, All Sides Are Now Taking Offense, PHILADLPHIA IN-
QUIRER, Aug. 6, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 13566218 (stating that cities and
municipalities maintain that "federal inaction on illegal immigration has forced them into
the role of immigration enforcers as they confront quality-of-life issues that strain
resources").
15. Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to
Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 482-83 (2008); see also Matt
Birkbeck, The Fight's Not Over: Appeals Expected in Hazleton Case After Judge Strikes
Down Law Regulating Illegal Immigrants, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), July 27, 2007,
at At, available at 2007 WLNR 14455745 (claiming that in July 2007, supporters of the
Hazleton rental ban maintained that appeals of the permanent injunction against its en-
forcement would follow). Hazleton's mayor, Lou Barletta, stated, "We are not going to
stop fighting for the quality of life that we value here in Hazleton. I realize today that
we're not only fighting for Hazleton any longer, we're fighting for cities all across the
country." Matt Birkbeck, The Fight's Not Over: Appeals Expected in Hazleton Case After
Judge Strikes Down Law Regulating Illegal Immigrants, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.),
July 27, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 14455745.
16. See Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Le-
gal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENy. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (2007) (discussing the
typical anti-immigrant ordinance provisions, which include penalties for employers who
knowingly hire undocumented immigrants, prohibit renting to undocumented immigrants,
and forbid businesses or municipal entities from printing publications in a language other
than English).
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This Note describes the issue of rental ban ordinances from a different
perspective, dealing principally with property rights. Although this Note
will discuss the issue from a position of property law, there will be rele-
vant discussion of constitutional rights, as constitutional rights are inte-
gral to the immigration issue and cannot be disregarded, even from a
property-related approach. There will be ample discussion of the consti-
tutional issues with respect to property rights of individuals affected by
rental bans, and this Note will approach the issue from the perspectives of
both prospective renters and landlords. Relevant sections of the Fair
Housing Act17 will be discussed in detail as it pertains to both landlords
and renters. Although it is speculative at this stage of legal development
to say whether appellate courts will ultimately rule against rental ban or-
dinances, an understanding of this issue, as well as the rights affecting
property owners and renters is necessary given the complicated future of
immigration ordinances. This Note seeks to illustrate how various areas
of law, including property law, may provide the framework for impending
litigation against cities that enact rental ban ordinances.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Genesis and Evolution of Rental Ban Ordinances
Cities that pass rental ban ordinances have adopted policies and cus-
toms that provide prospective plaintiffs with ample legal claims. Land-
lords, property owners, and apartment managers who adhere to the
requirements of rental ban ordinances will undoubtedly find themselves
in precarious circumstances and could conceivably incur liability for
merely carrying out city-mandated laws.
Proponents of rental bans maintain that cities have the right to imple-
ment their own immigration measures. 8 One could argue that cities that
place rental ban ordinances on the ballot are taking steps to reduce their
communities' facilitation of illegal immigration.1 9 But the regulation of
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
18. See Edward Sifuentes, FAIR Could Join Escondido to Defend Rental Ban, N.
COUNTRY TIMES (San Diego, Cal.), Oct. 28, 2006, available at http://www.nctimes.com/arti-
cles/2006/10/29/news/top-stories/22032810_28_06.txt (discussing the arguments made by
defenders of rental bans). Further, early twentieth-century Supreme Court precedents
support this argument. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281
U.S. 682, 686 (1930) (holding that a city is essentially an "arm of the state, [and] has ...
wide discretion in determining what precautions in the public interest are necessary or
appropriate under the circumstances"); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-17 (1923)
(echoing the idea that a state has broad discretion in determining public policy when con-
cerning the health, safety, and welfare of the public).
19. See Matt Birkbeck, The Fight's Not Over: Appeals Expected in Hazleton Case Af-
ter Judge Strikes Down Law Regulating Illegal Immigrants, MORNING CALL (Allentown,
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immigration is, by and large, a federal issue.2' The Supreme Court deci-
sion in DeCanas v. Bica encapsulates the issue of immigration regulation
as it pertains to state and federal power.21 In DeCanas, the Court ac-
knowledged the authority and power of states to act under the auspices of
state police power.22 Not giving complete deference to state power, the
DeCanas Court sustained the idea that state power will not always take
precedence when immigration issues are involved.23
B. Conflict of Laws
There are, however, many of the opinion that "[t]he text and structure
of the Constitution do not require federal exclusivity and instead admit of
a role for states and localities in enforcing immigration laws." 24 Despite
the fact that state immigration reform is subordinate to federal regulation
under the Supremacy Clause, cities that implement rental bans argue that
"permitting states and localities to have a role in determining levels of
immigration law enforcement would acknowledge the important eco-
nomic and social stake that subnational governments have in immigra-
tion.",25  Supporters of rental ban ordinances and other anti-illegal
immigration measures would posit that "[a] mere difference between
Pa.), July 27, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 14455745 (describing the city's attempts
to fight illegal immigration in order to combat immigrant crime).
20. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power." (citation omitted)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 356.
23. Id. at 361.
Under the Constitution the states .. can neither add nor take from the conditions
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens
in the United States or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory
burdens upon the entrance of residence of aliens lawfully within the United States
conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and
have accordingly been held invalid.
Id. at 358 n.6 (quoting Torao Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419
(1948)).
24. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 824 (2008) ("This conclusion is supported by historical practice and is
not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.").
25. Id. at 833; see also Kai Bartolomeo, Note, Immigration and the Constitutionality of
Local Self Help: Escondido's Un-Documented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. &
Soc. JUST. 855, 866-67 (2008) (discussing local self-help as an attempt to curb illegal immi-
gration). Cities' dissatisfaction with federally controlled immigration measures is obvious,
as evidenced by the fact that these measures are being adopted in cities across the country.
See Dianne Solis & Stephanie Sandoval, Pennsylvania Ruling May Jeopardize FB Rental
Ban: Federal Judge Rejects Similar Ordinance, but Local Official Unbowed, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, July 27, 2007, at 1A, available at 2007 WLNR 14446376 (noting the number of
cities that have attempted to pass rental bans).
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state and federal law is not conflict.",26 The placement of rental ban ordi-
nances on city ballots reflects a belief that immigration is not exclusively
a federal power. 27 Accordingly, many cities, even in the face of criticism
and judicial scrutiny, continue to propose rental ban ordinances.28
C. Rental Ban Layout
1. Prohibitions and Requirements for Property Owners
In Farmers Branch, Texas, a rental ban was unanimously adopted and
"overwhelmingly" approved by city council members and city voters.29
Rental bans in different cities take varied forms, but their requirements,
prohibitions, and penalties are aligned in terms of purpose. The Farmers
Branch ordinance, for example, sets out the following: "The owner and/or
property manager shall require as a prerequisite to entering into any
lease or rental arrangement, including . . . renewals or extensions, the
submission of evidence of citizenship, or eligible immigration status
.... "30 The ordinance further prohibits an owner or landlord from al-
lowing individuals to occupy apartments or units without first tendering
the required evidence of immigration status.3"
Prior to the injunction issued against the City of Hazleton, Hazleton's
ordinance provided for similar obligatory enforcement by landlords,
26. Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Napolitano, No. CV07-1355-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL
4570303, at *25 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2007) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)).
27. Kai Bartolomeo, Note, Immigration and the Constitutionality of Local Self Help:
Escondido's Un-Documented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 855,
866-67 (2008).
28. Natasha Altamirano, Localities Unmoved by Alien Decision; Resolutions Deemed
Lawful, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2007, at B01, available at 2007 WLNR 14676696 (identifying
some cities that appear unaffected by the court's decision in Hazleton). Hazleton's rental
ban was met not just by opposition, but found strong support in cities across the country.
Matt Birkbeck, The Fight's Not Over: Appeals Expected in Hazleton Case After Judge
Strikes Down Law Regulating Illegal Immigrants, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), July
27, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 14455745. In Pennsylvania, more than thirty
municipalities followed suit and sought the passage of illegal immigration measures. Id.
(discussing the "ripple effect" across the country after the Hazleton decision).
29. Stephanie Sandoval, Judge Halts Farmers Branch's Immigrant Rental Ban; Re-
straining Order Issued, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
17391271 (reporting on the third injunction issued against Farmers Branch in the city's
efforts to forbid property rentals for undocumented persons).
30. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), invalidated by Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/farmersbranch-ordinance.pdf.
31. Id.
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apartment managers, and property owners.32 The Hazleton ordinance re-
quired all occupants of rental units to obtain an occupancy permit.33 Ob-
taining a permit required applicants to show official documentation to
prove legal citizenship or immigration status.34
2. Punitive Measures for Violators
Another component of rental ban ordinances is the provision for pen-
alties for landlords, apartment managers, and property owners who ig-
nore or violate the rental ban. The Farmers Branch ordinance, for
example, provides that a violation of the rental ban ordinance makes the
violator guilty of a misdemeanor, 35 and, upon conviction, violators shall
be fined.36 Landlords, property owners, and apartment managers are not
necessarily to be fined for one isolated offense, but "a separate offense
shall be deemed committed upon each day during or on which a violation
occurs or continues. 37
The City of Escondido, California took a much more punitive approach
in the adoption of its rental ban ordinance.38 On October 18, 2006, Es-
condido adopted an ordinance entitled "Establishing Penalties for the
Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido."3 9 Escondido's
rental ban utilizes severe language for violators." The ordinance pro-
vides penalties for "any person or business that owns a dwelling unit" and
"harbor[s] an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered or remains in the
United States in violation of law ... "41 The ordinance's title, language,
and penalties make clear that Escondido has little compassion for those
undocumented immigrants who seek housing within the city, nor for indi-
viduals who "harbor" them through the rental of property.4 2
32. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), invalidated by Lozano v. City
of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332 (M.D. Pa. 2006), enforced, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa.
2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006).
36. Id. (imposing a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars for violations of the rental
ban).
37. Id.
38. See Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), invalidated by Garrett v.
City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/immigrants/escondido ordinance.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (articulating that an offense could potentially result in a "jail term of six
months").
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3. Harboring Leads to Prosecution
Federal courts have articulated the meaning of "harboring" within an
immigration context and have set forth the elements necessary to clearly
establish a cause of action for harboring an undocumented immigrant.43
This standard requires a clear showing that:
(1) [T]he alien entered or remained in the United States in violation
of law, (2) the defendant concealed, harbored or sheltered the alien
in the United States, (3) the defendant knew or recklessly disre-
garded that the alien entered or remained [and] (4) the defendant's
conduct tended to substantially facilitate the alien remaining in the
[country] illegally.44
In referring to harboring in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), "Congress intended to broadly proscribe any knowing or willful
conduct . that tends to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in
the United States illegally .... ""i With respect to the fourth prong for
conviction of aiding and abetting the harboring of an undocumented im-
migrant, the trier of fact need only find that a defendant made it easier
for an undocumented person to remain living in the United States.46
Plaintiffs in Garrett v. City of Escondido alleged that landlords and
property owners would suffer irreparable harm if forced to comply with
rental ban ordinances. 47 Landlords and property owners will "'face un-
43. United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1097 (2006).
44. Id.
45. United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 274A(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1524
(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2006)); see also 3A C.J.S. Aliens § 1580 (2008) ("'Haboring' encompasses
any conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States
illegally." (footnote omitted)). Defining what constitutes "harboring" is a serious point of
contention among courts. Sophie Marie Alcorn, Note, Landlords Beware, You May Be
Renting Your Own Room... in Jail. Landlords Should Not Be Prosecuted for Harboring
Aliens, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 289, 295-300 (2008). The circuits are split as to
the definition of "harboring," indicating that immigration reform is a serious point of con-
tention within the judicial branch. Id.
46. See United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (defining "substan-
tially facilitate[s]" as making it easier for undocumented individuals to remain in the
United States); United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999) (extending liability
for harboring to employers); United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 200 (5th Cir. 1997)
(defining facilitation as making it "easier or less difficult" for undocumented individuals),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1096 (1998); see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law:
What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459,
470-71 (2008) (discussing the troubles faced by immigration officials in stemming the flow
of illegal immigration and declaring employment as the primary reason for illegal
immigration).
47. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1051 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
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certainty' regarding which acts constitute the harboring of illegal aliens
given the complexity of federal immigration laws and [must] choose be-
tween violation of the ordinance or breaching valid contracts" with rent-
ers.48 Although different prongs must be satisfied to show that a
defendant aided and abetted the violation of immigration law by harbor-
ing an undocumented individual,49 and it is not guaranteed that a city will
be able to consistently prosecute landlords and property owners under
such stringent requirements, the language of rental ban ordinances serves
to foster fear of prosecution. In this way, rental ban ordinances are suc-
cessful in ensuring that landlords and property owners adhere to
regulations.
Despite the fear factor of a conviction for harboring, the landlord's
knowledge is a key component for meeting the harboring standard.5°
There is, however, little consistency among city ordinances with respect to
how knowledgeable a property owner or landlord must be in order to be
prosecuted for harboring. As an example,
the harboring definition passed by Cherokee County, Georgia in-
structs owners that they may not "let, lease, or rent" or "suffer or
permit occupancy" of a dwelling unit by any undocumented immi-
grant, "knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of the
law." Other local laws require a higher mens rea of acting
knowingly.51
The local standards are inconsistent, but this inconsistency does not nec-
essarily negate the harboring charges that landlords and property owners
may face if cities follow through with prosecuting violators of rental bans.
D. Parallel Ordinances and the Alleged Reasoning Behind Their
Implementation
1. Employment Verification
State-enacted immigration reform has taken effect through the imple-
mentation of a variety of ordinances. Employment, for example, is one
area of pervasive regulation. In Arizona Contractors Ass'n v. Napolitano,
plaintiffs filed for an injunction to prevent Arizona from implementing
48. Id.
49. See United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing
a test for the determination of harboring), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1097 (2006).
50. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 274A(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring
that a violation of the anti-harboring provision be knowing or willful).
51. Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777,
792 (2008) (footnote omitted) (explaining the definition of "harboring" as used by Chero-
kee County, Georgia).
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legislation requiring immigration status verification for individuals seek-
ing employment. 52 In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
the Arizona law sanctioning employers for the employment of undocu-
mented immigrants was found to be a valid exercise of state and local
laws.53 This case reinforces the idea that localities have some power with
respect to immigration reform, as per the court's holding that employers
have no due process right to employ undocumented aliens.54 The argu-
ments presented in favor of employment verification parallel the argu-
ments for rental ban ordinances. Just as employment verification serves
to retain jobs for legal citizens, proponents of rental bans would maintain
that the bans serve to protect citizens in a similar manner.55 Proponents
also argue that rental bans protect individual citizens from being party to
illegal immigration and insulate the housing and rental markets from the
negative impact of illegal immigrants.56
There is merit to the argument that curbing illegal immigration will
benefit states and localities. It is the means by which this is accomplished,
however, that must be thoroughly examined before any implementation
of a locality-based immigration plan.
52. Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Napolitano, No. CV07-1355-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL
4570303, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2007).
53. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2008),
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Beth
Werlin et al., Ninth Circuit Upholds Arizona Employer Sanctions Law, 3 LITIG. CLEARING-
HOUSE NEWSL. (AILF Legal Action Ctr., The Clearinghouse Project, Washington, D.C.),
Oct. 23, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/litclearinghouse/litclr-newsletter_
081023.pdf (noting the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Arizona act does not violate em-
ployers' rights or the rights of undocumented immigrants). Business and civil rights orga-
nizations maintained that the Legal Arizona Workers Act strips employers of their due
process rights because it does not allow them an opportunity to challenge an employee's
citizenship status before sanctions are imposed. Beth Werlin et al., Ninth Circuit Upholds
Arizona Employer Sanctions Law, 3 LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE NEWSL. (AILF Legal Action
Ctr., The Clearinghouse Project, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 23, 2008, at 1, available at http://
www.ailf.org/lac/litclearinghouse/litclr-newsletter_081023.pdf.
54. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc., 544 F.3d at 988.
55. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (summa-
rizing Hazleton's argument that the ordinance was "designed to prevent problems of social
disorder and chaos that city leaders connect to the presence of illegal aliens in Hazleton"),
enforced, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Hazleton argued that the presence of illegal
aliens leads to the diminishment of overall quality of life by leading to higher crime rates,
subjecting hospitals to fiscal hardship, and diminishing the quality of care for legal re-
sidents. Id. The mayor of Hazleton stated that these ordinances were passed partly in
response to the killing of a twenty-nine-year-old man by four illegal immigrants. Id.
56. See id. (detailing the city's arguments in favor of the rental ban).
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People v. Crane discusses state power with respect to immigration.5 7 In
an opinion authored by Justice Cardozo, Crane dealt with the employ-
ment of "aliens."58 Mention is made of Justice Cardozo's opinion be-
cause of the obvious parallels between employment and rental ban
ordinances within the immigration context. Justice Cardozo observed:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary dis-
crimination; for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the re-
sources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of
the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be. It is
not for that reason unlawful.
The state, in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys,
may legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens, rather than
that of aliens. Whatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be
made dependent upon citizenship. In its war against poverty, the
state is not required to dedicate its own resources to citizens and
aliens alike.59
2. Curbing the Facilitation of Illegal Presence
Cities that implement rental ban ordinances maintain that locally initi-
ated immigration measures are necessary to combat crime, curtail finan-
cial burdens, prevent the harboring of illegal immigrants, and curb the
overall facilitation of illegal presence.6 ° Though historical in context, Jus-
tice Cardozo's words provide support for advocates of rental bans, and
cities may look to history for support, as contemporary immigration is-
sues echo issues of the past.6 But, in opposition to Justice Cardozo's
observation, one could maintain that "concern for fiscal integrity" is not a
57. 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915) (detailing states' power to discriminate against
aliens in the distribution of public resources), affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). "[T]he common
property of the state belongs to the people of the state, and hence that, in any distribution
of that property, the citizens may be preferred." Id.
58. Id. at 429-30.
59. Id. (elaborating on the states' prerogative to dispense public resources for the ben-
efit of their citizens and to the exclusion of aliens); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 373 (1971) (stating that the Court has used the same reasoning to uphold other
state statutes that restrict the rights of aliens and noncitizens).
60. E.g., Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(citing Escondido's argument that the city's rental ban curbs the "increasing trend of urban
blight" caused by illegal renters' fear of reporting substandard maintenance conditions (ci-
tation omitted)); Lozano, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36 (noting Hazleton's intent to prevent
"[slocial disorder and chaos that city leaders connect to the presence of illegal aliens in
Hazleton").
61. See Crane, 108 N.E. at 431 (affirming a conviction for unlawful hiring of aliens).
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satisfactory justification for creating rental ban ordinances, as "an alien as
well as a citizen is a 'person' for equal protection purposes., 62
Adoption of ordinances is experimental in nature, in that the results
will show either widespread success or complete failure. 63 "Such laws
help to inform states and localities about more and less effective means of
encouraging and discouraging migration."' What cities have not ac-
counted for, however, is the interconnection between rental bans and
property rights, as well as the potential for abuse of the ordinances.
Mandating that landlords verify immigration status and excluding un-
documented immigrants from housing are not mutually exclusive. Ar-
guably, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants is exactly what rental
ban ordinances propose to accomplish. But the legal implications of
rental ban ordinances are far-reaching and apply beyond the immigration
context.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Scope of Property Ownership and the Agitation of Property
Rights
1. Theory of Property Ownership
The right to own property is widely regarded as a sacred right.65 The
theory of property as sacred is furthered by the fact that "a property in-
terest consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but includes
the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal., 6 6 By extension,
the right to rent one's property is an incident to title and possession.67
An owner of property has a right to sell property, and others have a right
62. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 375 (discussing the rights of aliens for equal protection
purposes).
63. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 847 (2008) ("The ordinances will help to inform other governments
about the costs and benefits of these measures."). Such ordinances will also serve as in-
dicators to non-citizens as to which localities are welcoming and which ones are not. Id.
64. Id.; see also L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting the Freedom of Undocu-
mented Immigrants as Violations of Equal Protection and Principles of Federal Preemption,
52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479, 479 (2008) (arguing that locality-based immigration laws are
hostile in nature).
65. See April Sound Mgmt. Corp. v. Concerned Prop. Owners for April Sound, Inc.,
153 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (noting that the right to dominion
over property is an accepted theory of law and addressing the extent of the term
"property").
66. Id. at 524 (citation omitted).
67. Benson v. Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank, 253 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining that restrictions upon the right to alienation
of property are contrary to both settled law and public policy).
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to purchase for sale or for rent.68 Restraint on property is generally un-
derstood to be an invalid exercise of public policy.
A direct corollary of adopted rental bans is the restraint on property
rights that invariably results. Exclusive dominion over private property
provides an owner the right to rent freely and without restraint, provided
that the rental of property does not "contravene law or public policy." 69
The crafting and subsequent adoption of rental ban ordinances unequivo-
cally alters public policy and sets in place new laws that modify property
rights. Property owners who rent their property for financial gain are
undeniably subjected to reduced rights and must, as many ordinances
stipulate, abide by city legislation or face stringent penalties.
Adopted rental ban ordinances may prevent property owners from dis-
posing of their property through lease agreements as a result of increased
burdens that they are obligated by ordinance to follow. "[O]wnership of
land by legal title in fee carries with it the right to sell, mortgage, or oth-
erwise alienate property at any time,"7 and, arguably, this right is inclu-
sive of rental agreements between a property owner or landlord and an
interested tenant.
2. Constitutional Protections for Property Owners
A property owner may challenge a rental ban ordinance on due process
grounds.7' Garrett v. City of Escondido set the stage for questions relat-
ing to due process for landlords, as well as tenants, as a result of insuffi-
cient procedures "for administrative review before a landlord would be
required to institute eviction proceedings" against a tenant. 72 A govern-
mental entity can impose regulations, such as zoning or other land use
regulations, but interference with land use must "bear a substantial rela-
68. 59 TEX. JUR. 3D Property § 13 (2008). But see Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887-88 (2007) (maintaining that, while the common law
rule that restraints upon property are generally invalid, the Supreme Court has held both
that the rule should not be dispositive and that other factors, such as duration, purpose,
and method of determining price, should be taken into consideration before rendering a
restraint upon alienation invalid); Urquhart v. Teller, 958 P.2d 714, 718 (Mont. 1998) (stat-
ing that a restraint on alienation is more likely to be deemed reasonable and valid if both
parties mutually agree to the restraint or if the individual imposing the restraint has some
interest in the property).
69. April Sound Mgmt. Corp., 153 S.W.3d at 524 (citation omitted).
70. Trustees of the Casa View Assembly of God Church v. Williams, 414 S.W.2d 697,
702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
71. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding that plaintiff landlords "have a legitimate property interest in collecting rent" that
triggers the right to adequate notice and opportunity for hearing prior to deprivation of
that interest).
72. Id. at 1059.
[Vol. 12:291
RENTAL BANS
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare., 73 Although
cities that impose rental bans maintain that one reason for their imple-
mentation is protection of the public, 7" property owners may find success
if they can show that the deprivation of property rights that results from
rental bans outweighs the alleged protection of the public. 75 Opponents
of rental ban ordinances, however, are impeded by the fact that there is a
presumption of validity for local ordinances.76 Plaintiffs challenging local
rental ban ordinances will need to overcome the presumption of validity
by a clear showing of an ordinance's ambiguity, irrelevance, or
unconstitutionality. 77
It is universally recognized that "[a] property right is not bare title, but
the right of exclusive use and enjoyment."78 Courts have traditionally
recognized and held that a deprivation of property is a substantive due
process violation.79 Since the right to own and dispose of property may
be interpreted as a liberty interest protected by the Constitution,8" prop-
erty owners affected by rental bans may have a valid claim against cities.
In proving a substantive due process violation, plaintiffs must show a con-
73. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
74. E.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335-36 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(citing "[s]ocial disorder and chaos" as evils the Hazleton rental ban sought to cure), en-
forced, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
75. See Polenz, 883 F.2d at 558 (suggesting that upon a showing that an ordinance is
arbitrary, unreasonable, or is not designed to promote the "public health, safety, or wel-
fare," a plaintiff's claim based on a theory of substantive due process will prevail).
76. See City of Anchorage v. Richardson Vista Corp., 242 F.2d 276, 285 (9th Cir. 1957)
(stressing that deference should be given to municipalities absent a showing of unreasona-
bleness or unconstitutionality). Although this case does not render judgment on a rental
ban ordinance, the court's opinion is analogous to the rental ban issue. Id. Thus, parallels
can be drawn to rental ban litigation from this opinion, which provides:
It must be kept in mind that the courts cannot set aside city ordinances unless they are
unconstitutional or ultra vires, or in some special connection or effect, unreasonable.
On the contrary, unless the ordinance is unnecessarily oppressive or unreasonable it is
the duty of the court to uphold it. It is a well settled rule that where an ordinance is
passed relating to a matter within the legislative power of the municipality all pre-
sumptions are in favor of its constitutionality, and reasonableness.
Id.
77. See id. at 286 ("If the municipality has power to enact an ordinance, it may not be
set aside by the courts merely on the ground of hardship, harshness, injustice, unfairness or
because of commercial advantage or disadvantages resulting from the enactment.").
78. Polenz, 883 F.2d at 557 (quoting Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949
(7th Cir. 1983)).
79. See, e.g., id. at 558 (recognizing certain rights of the ownership of property).
80. Id. (holding that liberty interests may be directly protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment if plaintiffs can show a connection between deprivation of property and a
constitutional right).
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nection between the violation and the fact that the ordinance "bears no
substantial relation to the public health, safety or morals," as well as show
that the land-use ordinance at issue is "arbitrary and unreasonable."81 In
sum, the standard requires that the plaintiff prove that state law remedies
will not suffice to remedy a clear violation of a constitutional right.8 2
It has been widely held, however, that where property interests are de-
prived or violated, a due process claim will often be recognized out-
right.83 As the right to own property is, arguably, a due process right,
property owners will likely have a cause of action against a city that im-
poses a rental ban and the subsequent restraint on their property.84
Property owners could maintain a cause of action premised on the histori-
cal perspective that the right to possess and dispose of property is an
inherent and essential right of United States citizenship. 85 This right to
dispose of property carries with it certain entitlements and privileges that
should not be subverted, as "[i]t is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. '86
3. City Liability for Property Violations Against Owners of Real
Property
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that government offi-
cials, no matter in what capacity they serve a city, municipality, or state,
are insulated from civil liability, so long as their actions do not infringe
upon statutorily protected rights "of which a reasonable person would
have known."87 This understanding of liability for public officials was
refined in the Anderson v. Creighton decision, in which the Court held
81. Id. (quoting Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1983)).
82. Id. (proposing the standard that must be met by a plaintiff claiming an invalid land
ordinance). The court imposes a heavy burden for the property owner that is justified
because local zoning boards are presumed to have fairly imposed the restriction until the
property owner proves a violation of substantive due process. Id.
83. See Harding v. County of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that in a
land use ordinance dealing specifically with zoning, only a clear showing of an irrational
zoning decision will constitute a violation of due process), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989);
Polenz, 883 F.2d at 558 (stating that substantive violation of due process claims will some-
times be inferred in land-use ordinance conflicts); Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d
1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Ijn order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, plain-
tiffs must allege and prove that the denial of their proposal is arbitrary and unreasonable
bearing no substantial relationship to public health, safety or welfare.").
84. See Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing due
process rights).
85. See id. (stating that citizenship includes the right of property ownership).
86. Id.
87. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted) (establishing an objective reference
for defining the limits of qualified immunity).
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that the constitutionally protected right must be "clearly established, 88
and was further expanded upon in Wade v. Hegner.89 In Wade, the Court
established a two-prong test for analyzing liability of government offi-
cials.9° A court must inquire as to whether the alleged conduct of the
official violates a constitutional right and whether the constitutional right
was established at the time of the violation.9" The Harlow Court recog-
nized immunity issues that could arise as a result of officials' inability to
know whether a right was clearly established as a constitutional right.92
The Court understood that officials may not be apprised of or "reasona-
bly be expected to anticipate" legal developments regarding certain
rights.93
The issue of qualified immunity may become convoluted if cities main-
tain that the right to rent and dispose of property is not clearly protected;
however, one could reasonably argue that an interpretation of substan-
tive due process guarantees the right to own property, which carries with
it the right to rent property without restraint. Thus, this right is clearly
established and, therefore, clearly protected. Violations of this right by
city officials through the continued implementation of rental bans illus-
trate ways in which cities and municipalities may be liable for implement-
ing and adopting policies or customs that restrain property rights. Thus,
the assertion of qualified immunity will not necessarily protect city offi-
cials from being haled into court.
88. 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (redefining the Supreme Court's earlier standard for ana-
lyzing qualified immunity of public officials when dealing with constitutional rights). The
Court elaborated:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previ-
ously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in dire light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. 804 F.2d 67, 69-70 (7th Cir. 1986).
90. Id. at 70 (laying out the appropriate approach to dissecting the qualified immunity
issue as it relates to civil liability).
91. Id.
92. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (requiring a clear showing of established law when
deciding a qualified immunity issue).
93. Id. at 818 (implementing a standard under which a government representative or
official is shielded from liability absent knowledge that a right is clearly established and
protected); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 651 n.3 (discussing the evolution of the qualified
immunity rule).
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4. The Right to Use and Enjoyment of Property and the Restraint
on Property Ownership
It is widely recognized that an owner of property may transfer rights to
other parties to make use of the surface or subsurface of property.9 4 By
definition, this transfer of rights can encompass or be characterized as a
rental of real property." "'Property' is a word of comprehensive mean-
ing and extends to every species of valuable right and interest in real...
property."9 6 Owners of property may rent their interest in that property
within the bounds of applicable law.97
Rental ban ordinances do not categorically prevent owners of property
from renting, but rather impose a burden on property owners wherein
their right to rent property is controlled by a potentially discriminatory
housing requirement.9 8 Property owners are entitled to utilize their dis-
cretion as to whether they rent their property for profit.99 As long as
property owners do not violate public policy or established laws, they
have a statutorily protected right to dispose of their property through
rental agreements.' 0 0 Rental bans, however, effectively force property
owners and landlords to violate federal housing regulations by requiring
them to uphold city regulations.1 ' Violations of federal regulations are
manifested through blatant violations of the Fair Housing Act.
94. See, e.g., Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (Tex. 1923) ("It is
elementary that the minerals in place may be severed from the remainder of the land by
appropriate conveyances." (citation omitted)); Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 860 S.W.2d
157, 159 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (providing that owners of land retain
possession of title to the property and subsequently have the ability to extend rights to a
third party for use and enjoyment).
95. See Mobil Pipe Line Co., 860 S.W.2d at 159 (discussing the rental of property).
96. April Sound Mgmt. Corp. v. Concerned Prop. Owners for April Sound, Inc., 153
S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.). For example, property owners in a
subdivision own significant rights and benefits to recreational opportunities. Id. at 525.
These rights and benefits are owned commonly by all property owners in the subdivision.
Id. Moreover, these common areas have "a significant impact on property values of lots in
the subdivision." Id.
97. Id. at 525.
98. E.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757,
771 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (concluding that the Farmers Branch rental ordinance imposes addi-
tional requirements upon landlords designed to drive undocumented immigrants from the
city).
99. April Sound Mgmt. Corp., 153 S.W.3d at 525.
100. Id.
101. See Fair Housing Act § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (prohibiting landlords
from discriminating against potential tenants based on "race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin" (emphasis added)).
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B. Potential Liability of Owners
1. Violations of the Fair Housing Act
Not only are independent property owners restrained from freely rent-
ing property, but property owners, landlords, and apartment managers
are, likewise, forced to comply with what can be interpreted as violations
of federal law. Rental bans pursue a policy that may give rise to viola-
tions of the Fair Housing Act.102
The 1968 adoption of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) made discrimina-
tion-based claims legally viable for renters who encounter inequity in the
housing market. 103 The FHA recognized the importance of protecting
individuals who may suffer discrimination because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin. 104 Property owners, landlords, and
apartment managers may select tenants based on objective criteria, but
the FHA does not allow for unlawful discrimination.10 5 Federal law addi-
tionally requires that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every state and [t]erritory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite persons
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
102. See id. (prohibiting discrimination in provision of housing).
103. Id.
104. Id. Those dwellings covered by the FHA include:
dwellings owned or operated by the [f]ederal [g]overnment ... dwellings provided in
whole or in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants, or contributions made by the
[flederal [g]overnment .. .dwellings provided in whole or in part by loans insured,
guaranteed, or otherwise secured by the credit of the [flederal [g]overnment... dwell-
ings provided by the development or the redevelopment of real property purchased,
rented, or otherwise obtained from a [sitate or local public agency receiving [flederal
financial assistance for slum clearance or urban renewal.
Id. § 803(a)(1). The FHA does not apply to a "single-family house sold or rented by the
owner" or to "rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended
to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the
owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence." Id.
§ 803(b).
105. Id. § 804 (stating that discriminatory acts shall be unlawful under the statute).
Interestingly, section 807 of the Fair Housing Act provides exceptions for religious organi-
zations and private clubs. Id. § 807. Under that section, any "religious organization, asso-
ciation, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or
controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society" may
limit the sale or rental of dwellings that it owns or operates to people of the same religious
faith. Id. § 807(a). In other words, section 807 does not prohibit religious organizations or
private clubs from preferring their own members. Id.
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sonal property. ' 106 Further, official, as well as private, discriminatory in-
trusion of property interests is unlawful. 10 7
Rental bans do not explicitly state that a landlord, property owner, or
apartment manager cannot rent to individuals not of the White race, nor
do they contain any other specification as to race;'0 8 however, rental bans
requiring the documentation of immigration status are the catalyst for
discrimination based on race and national origin. It can be assumed that
property owners, landlords, and apartment managers will be more likely
to request documentation of status from individuals not of the White
race, and "local ordinances prohibiting the rental of property to undocu-
mented persons will lead to landlords turning away United States citizens
and legal permanent residents whom they believe may be illegally present
merely because of their race, color, or national origin . ".1.."'09 In effect,
requests for documentation will be racially motivated because landlords,
property owners, and apartment managers are not qualified to assess or
"determine the immigration status of potential tenants ... [and] the inevi-
table result of such ordinances is that landlords will avoid renting to per-
sons of certain ethnic backgrounds ....
The penalties levied on property owners will perpetuate racial and eth-
nic stereotypes, and the vague definitions of immigration status in the
language of rental ban ordinances will "have the effect of encouraging
racial and ethnic profiling of persons seeking to contract with landlords
[and property owners].""' The language of rental bans does not require
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006) (emphasizing that all U.S. citizens have the same rights
regarding personal property).
107. Shaare Tefila Congragation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616 (1987) (citing Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968)) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits
both public and private discrimination as a means of interference with property rights).
108. E.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), invalidated by Villas
at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007),
available at http://www.aclu.orgpdfs/immigrants/farmersbranch-ordinance.pdf.
109. Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal
Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2007) (discussing the
illegal consequences of compliance with local ordinances).
110. Id.
111. Id. (addressing the inherent and illegal effects of the local regulations that target
illegal immigration); see also Julia Preston, City's Immigration Restrictions Go on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 4697901 (discussing the Hazle-
ton ordinance). Prior to the July 2007 decision in the Hazleton case, Hazleton's mayor,
Louis J. Barletta, discussed the Hazleton ordinance as a ban against illegal immigrants, not
individuals of certain races or ethnicities. Julia Preston, City's Immigration Restrictions Go
on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 4697901. In response
to many questions and objections, the Hazleton ordinance was revised several times before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
Id. Even after the revisions, however, Mayor Barletta stated that the basic purpose behind
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that landlords and property owners request documentation from mem-
bers of particular races; rather, landlords and property owners are re-
quired to implement the ordinance to the extent that they request
documentation from all prospective tenants.' 12 But this requirement may
lead to abuse of the ordinance." 3 Rental ban ordinances stipulate rules
that would effectively force landlords to "evaluate a wide array of immi-
gration documents to determine whether the person carrying them is le-
gally in the country. ' 14 As a result, landlords and property owners are
required to act as immigration officers, despite their lack of training and
knowledge of immigration law.1 15
the law remained the same-"to make Hazleton hostile territory for illegal immigrants."
Id.
112. E.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006) (requiring documen-
tation from any and all prospective tenants). It is important not to overlook the fact that a
noncitizen must first qualify for "eligible immigration status" before he can obtain the
necessary documents. Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 769. Since "HUD
regulations do not include all noncitizens lawfully in the country under federal immigration
standards," and the ordinance is based off of HUD's definitions concerning citizenship and
legal immigration status, certain legal noncitizens, such as students who are in the country
temporarily, will be denied renting an apartment in Farmers Branch. Id.
113. Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal,
Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENy. U. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2007).
114. Anabelle Garay, Texas Town Gets Tough on Illegal Immigration: Farmers
Branch, Texas, Approved Anti-Immigration Measures Monday Night. One Makes English
the Official Language, INTELLIGENCER (Wheeling, W.Va.), Nov. 14, 2006, at A8, available
at 2006 WLNR 20030654; see also Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 777, 782-83 (2008) (defining the scope of private enforcement and
arguing that individuals become private enforcers); Kai Bartolomeo, Note, Immigration
and the Constitutionality of Local Self Help: Escondido's Un-Documented Immigrant
Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 855, 884 (2008) (questioning the feasibility of
enforcement of the Escondido ordinance). Consider the following:
To begin with, it is unclear how "any official, business entity, or resident of [a] [c]ity"
could be expected to enforce accurately [an] [o]rdinance without prior exposure to the
"hundreds of pages of complicated regulations concerning different ways people can
be lawfully present in the United States." The concerns voiced over "whether officials
will have the proper training and expertise required to enforce immigration regula-
tions" are amplified when considering private residents who have little to rely on be-
yond mere intuition.
Kai Bartolomeo, Note, Immigration and the Constitutionality of Local Self Help: Escon-
dido's Un-Documented Immigrant Rental Ban, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SoC. JUST. 855, 884
(2008) (footnotes omitted).
115. Anabelle Garay, Texas Town Gets Tough on Illegal Immigration: Farmers
Branch, Texas, Approved Anti-Immigration Measures Monday Night. One Makes English
the Official Language, INTELLIGENCER (Wheeling, W.Va.), Nov. 14, 2006, at A8, available
at 2006 WLNR 20030654. After voting, the city council of Farmers Branch, Texas also
approved fines for landlords who choose to conduct business with illegal immigrants. Id.
The city council additionally decided to allow local authorities to use screen devices on
suspects in custody to determine whether they are illegally in the United States. Id. After
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One can only assume the worst: that landlords will, on the whole, re-
quest documentation of immigration status from certain individuals who
appear to be members of a certain race or ethnicity or who appear to be
of a particular national origin. "Determining what race, [ethnicity, or na-
tional origin] a person belongs to is not necessarily an easy task,"' 16 and
landlords and property owners "do not possess the skills or the resources
to determine the legal status of individuals they suspect as being an 'ille-
gal alien' under the ordinances. Therefore, landlords are more likely to
make judgments based on easily ascertainable indicators of national-
ity.' 117 These "easily ascertainable indicators" will invariably be predi-
cated upon race and ethnicity.'18 Consequently, some landlords and
property owners may forgo requesting documentation from some individ-
uals and deny them housing outright based upon the prospective renters'
physical features that may give rise to presumptions about the renters'
immigration status. Thus, citizens and lawful permanent residents may be
denied housing based on physical traits; for example, citizens and lawful
permanent residents of certain ethnicities will be lumped into a landlord's
physical definition of what undocumented immigrants look like." 9
2. Racial Steering
Discrimination takes varied forms. A prime example of discrimination
in a property law context is discrimination through "racial steering." Ra-
cial steering occurs when an apartment manager or landlord "preserve[s]
these laws were passed, Farmers Branch became the first Texas municipality to enact such
stringent anti-immigration laws. Id.
116. Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights: The Evolution of Private Ra-
cist Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7 NEV. L.J. 895, 912 (2007).
117. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 537 (2008) (suggesting that landlords are
placed in a precarious position when forced to decide if a particular individual is an illegal
immigrant).
118. See id. (indicating the broadness of the indicators that landlords rely upon to
determine if a person qualifies to be a tenant). Because identification of race and national
origin are among these indicators, rental ban ordinances make it known to Latin immi-
grants that their race and national origin will be scrutinized by landlords in rental deci-
sions. Id. at 537-38. "The ordinances' vagueness in describing what constitutes an 'illegal
alien' and their stated purposes bolster the threatening nature of the laws because they
allow for almost unfettered discretion in their enforcement." Id. at 538-39 (footnotes
omitted).
119. See Sophie Marie Alcorn, Note, Landlords Beware, You May Be Renting Your
Own Room... in Jail: Landlords Should Not Be Prosecuted for Harboring Aliens, 7 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 289, 303 (2008) ("[C]oncerned landlords would probably evict
many aliens present lawfully [in the United States] because they are unfamiliar with the
range of valid documents.").
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and encourage[s] patterns of racial segregation ... by steering members
of racial and ethnic groups to buildings occupied primarily by members of
[the same] racial and ethnic groups . ...,,120 Although rental ban ordi-
nances were not crafted or intentionally calculated to promote racial
steering, the adoption of rental bans may result in an alternative form of
racial steering. This alternative form of racial steering is one of the pit-
falls of these ordinances, as enforcement of rental bans may force individ-
uals of certain races, national origins, and ethnic groups to relocate to
areas where rental bans are not policy. Even legal citizens and lawful
permanent residents of certain races and ethnicities (most likely Latinos)
who face discrimination when seeking to rent an apartment may choose
to relocate to an area that they perceive as less discriminatory.1 21
The holding in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman highlights the liability
for racial steering that property owners and landlords could face in rental
ban litigation. 122 The plaintiffs in Havens Realty alleged that owners of
an apartment complex violated the Fair Housing Act in their practice of
racial steering. 123 Plaintiffs asserted they "had been deprived of the ben-
efits of interracial association arising from living in an integrated commu-
nity free of housing discrimination., 124  Similarly, landlords'
implementation of rental ban ordinances will begin a domino effect,
whereby racial and ethnic segregation will proliferate. Although inde-
pendent landlords and property owners may not intend for their actions
to result in racial steering, compliance with rental ban ordinances will
invariably culminate in racial and ethnic segregation.125
The effects of a rental ban ordinance in Riverside, New Jersey confirm
how rental bans will engender a type of racial steering that results in indi-
120. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 367 n.1 (1982) (defining "racial
steering" in the context of a violation of the FHA). Racial steering is defined not by the
court, but rather by the complainants. Id.
121. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 534 (2008) (arguing that it is essentially
unavoidable that lawful immigrants will be affected by locality-based ordinances).
122. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 382.
123. Id. at 367 n.1; see also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94
(1979) (addressing the topic of racial steering). In Gladstone, the Court defined racial
steering as "directing prospective home buyers interested in equivalent properties to dif-
ferent areas according to their race." Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 94.
124. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 369.
125. See Sophie Marie Alcorn, Note, Landlords Beware, You May Be Renting Your
Own Room... in Jail: Landlords Should Not Be Prosecuted for Harboring Aliens, 7 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 289, 303, 305 (2008) (stating that rental bans can cause land-
lords to discriminate against documented immigrants).
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viduals leaving the city for more accepting areas. 126 A large population
of documented and undocumented immigrants left Riverside before en-
forcement of the rental ban ordinance commenced, illustrating how a
not-yet-enforced ordinance spawned a mass exodus and arguably forti-
fied racial segregation. 127 Prospective renters who may appear to land-
lords to be of a particular national origin will certainly be discouraged
from renting in cities that adopt rental bans.
3. Vicarious Liability
The FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of property and,
specifically, provides for the protection of various classes of individu-
als. 128 Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn involved a com-
plaint by a treatment center for emotionally disturbed women. 129 The
center argued that city officials created obstacles that "resulted in the
126. See Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Fed-
eral Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants Access
to Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 554-55 (2008) (discussing the effects of a
rental ban ordinance in Riverside, New Jersey). Within months of the passage of the ordi-
nance prohibiting the renting to or employing of undocumented immigrants, hundreds, if
not thousands, of recent immigrants from Brazil and other Latin American countries fled.
Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Town Rethinks Law Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 18841236. "As the local economy suffered
and the town defended itself against two lawsuits, the ordinance was rescinded." Id.
127. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 554-55 (2008); Edward Imperatore, Note,
Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing Act, 96 GEO. L.J. 1027, 1030 (2008)
(articulating characteristics of "blight," a term that describes a neighborhood turning into a
slum). The areas to which these individuals relocate might potentially become blighted
because of resultant segregation. Edward Imperatore, Note, Discriminatory Condemna-
tions and the Fair Housing Act, 96 GEO. L.J. 1027, 1030 (2008). Blight is often character-
ized by urban conditions that plague city neighborhoods. Id. One could argue that slum
neighborhoods will, without question, emerge in the wake of an exodus of illegal immi-
grants. Id. The result of the establishment of more slum neighborhoods and "slumlords"
would be the segregation of an entire illegal population. Id.; Mike King, Lawmakers, Nail
Slumlords, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Mar. 1, 2007, at A19, available at 2007 WLNR 3904425
(proposing that segregation of neighborhoods fosters blight). Undocumented immigrants
are less inclined to complain of or report violations in housing maintenance because of
their illegal status. Mike King, Lawmakers, Nail Slumlords, ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Mar. 1,
2007, at A19, available at 2007 WLNR 3904425. Consequently, slum neighborhoods will
follow the expulsion of undocumented immigrants from certain cities that adhere to rental
bans. Id.
128. Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
129. Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reviewing the action brought by a nonprofit corporation working to help emotionally dis-
turbed women).
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denial of dwellings for .. .handicapped" individuals.1 3' The claims
brought by plaintiffs in Meadowbriar are analogous to potential claims
that may be brought by individuals claiming discrimination as a result of
rental ban ordinances.131 The handicapped are a protected class under
the FHA, as are racial and ethnic minorities. 132 The Meadowbriar plain-
tiffs brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein officials may be
liable for acting pursuant to a city's official custom or policy.1 33
Two of the defendants in Meadowbriar, an assistant city attorney and a
senior fire inspector, were found to have qualified immunity because of
their positions as public officials.' 34  Although plaintiffs lost on their
claim of conspiracy, this case provides the framework for establishing a
legally viable conspiracy claim.' 35  Conspiracy claims may be brought
against cities and municipalities under § 1983.136 Under § 1983,
"[m]unicipalities and cities qualify as persons liable to suit.' 1 37 For a
claim to be successful under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a city's or
municipality's official adoption of a discriminatory policy.' 3 ' The munici-
pality must have itself caused the violation for the municipality to be lia-
ble,' 39 or a plaintiff must show that "a person acting under color of state
law" committed the alleged act of discrimination. t4 ° City officials and
cities themselves are not immune from suit, provided that the plaintiff
meets his or her burden of proof.' 4 '
To establish support for a claim falling under § 1983, the plaintiff must
successfully show that: "1) a policy or custom existed; 2) the governmen-
tal [policy-makers] actually or constructively knew of its existence; 3) a
130. Id.
131. See id. (discussing the parties' claims).
132. Fair Housing Act § 804 (a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d) (2006).
133. Meadowbriar Home for Children, 81 F.3d at 532 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
134. Id. at 529.
135. See id. at 532 (holding that defendants satisfied elements for qualified immunity
and, therefore, plaintiffs' claims could not be sustained).
136. Meadowbriar Home for Children, 81 F.3d at 532-33 (indicating that cities and
municipalities are not entirely immune from suit).
137. Meadowbriar Home for Children, 81 F.3d at 532 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 532 (requiring a clear showing that the city implemented or executed a
policy that violated constitutional rights).
139. Id.; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (concluding that "a
municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the
constitutional violation at issue" (emphasis in original)).
140. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
141. Id.; see also Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violat-
ing Federal Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immi-
grants' Access to Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 529, 547 (2008) (maintaining
that a plaintiff must meet two prerequisites to satisfy the burden of proof for a claim under
§ 1983 when directing claims against a municipality).
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constitutional violation occurred; and 4) the custom or policy served as
the moving force behind the violation., 142 Customs or policies that foster
discrimination may also result in liability for public officials who imple-
ment them. The issues of municipality liability and liability of individuals
acting under the "color of state law" coincide with matters of rental ban
liability. An examination of party liability requires consideration of
agent-principal liability as well.
An agent is under no obligation to adhere to and execute his principal's
order that, if carried out, may result in an illegal act.1 43 Although inde-
pendent property owners are not agents working under a principal within
the traditional definition of agency, one may draw comparisons between
an agent's liability and a property owner's liability in carrying out an ille-
gal act. Furthermore, property owners should be wary of adhering to
rental ban ordinances, as they may incur vicarious liability for discrimina-
tory actions in violation of the Fair Housing Act.'4 4 Although speculative
and hypothetical, when the analogy is drawn between vicarious liability of
an agent and the liability of property owners for blatant statutory viola-
tions, the property owner embodies the role of the agent, while the city
acts as the principal. It follows that an agent "'is not relieved from liabil-
ity by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on ac-
count of the principal.'" 45 Although a plaintiff's argument will likely not
mirror an agent-principal liability claim, one could conceivably draw par-
allels between the acts committed by an agent acting under a principal
and a property owner acting under a city-mandated ordinance; in this
way, the property owner "is himself liable as a joint tortfeasor."' 4 6
4. A Pattern of Discrimination
Arguably, plaintiffs bringing a cause of action against a city that adopts
a rental ban ordinance can show that the ordinance targeted a specific
142. Meadowbriar Home for Children, 81 F.3d at 532-33 (citation omitted) (outlining
the prerequisite elements that must be proven in order to win a claim based on an allega-
tion of the existence of an official custom).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 411 (1958) ("In accordance with and
subject to the conditions stated in the Restatement of Contracts, one who undertakes to
perform service as the agent of another is not liable for failing to perform such service if, at
the time of the undertaking or of performance, such service is illegal.").
144. See Fair Housing Act § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) ("It is the policy of the
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States.").
145. Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958)) (stressing the fact that an agent is liable
for an unlawful act, even if he is directed by the principal).
146. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 cmt. d (1958)) (dis-
cussing the potential liability of agents acting under or at the command of a principal).
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group. Despite the fact that rental ban ordinances do not explicitly target
any one race, ethnicity, or national origin, the aggregate effect of discrim-
ination on one specific group could evidence the group's compensable
injury. "While a discriminatory purpose is most often evidenced by legis-
lative intent, it may also be shown by 'a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race ... even when the governing legislation appears
neutral on its face.' "147
Merely couching rental ban ordinances in seemingly harmless language
will not necessarily secure cities against liability. Although proponents of
rental ban ordinances maintain that the implementation of ordinances ef-
fectively reduces illegal immigration, it is not guaranteed that legal citi-
zens and lawful permanent residents of a particular race, ethnicity, or
national origin will not feel the discriminatory effects of a city's adopted
policy. 148 The possibility that landlords and property owners will be una-
ble to avoid discriminating against prospective renters because of the in-
tricacies of rental bans and their ignorance of immigration regulations
will lead to violations of the FHA. 149
C. Recourse for Prospective Renters
1. Protection Afforded by the FHA
Violations of the FHA and rental ban ordinances requiring prospective
tenants to tender proof of immigration status are both aspects of the im-
migration issue. There is no explicit prohibition against states enacting
regulations that touch and concern immigration. 5 ° According to the
Fifth Circuit:
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent
and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though
left by the statute of judicial determination, are nevertheless federal
questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the statute
and the federal policy which it has adopted. 15
147. Edward Imperatore, Note, Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing
Act, 96 GEO. L.J. 1027, 1038 (2008) (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
148. Sophie Marie Alcorn, Note, Landlords Beware, You May Be Renting Your Own
Room... in Jail: Landlords Should Not Be Prosecuted for Harboring Aliens, 7 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 289, 304-05 (2008).
149. See id. at 305 ("If the landlord denies a lawfully present applicant and the appli-
cant suspects that the decision was based on alienage or national origin discrimination, the
applicant can sue the landlord under the [FHA]." (footnote omitted)).
150. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (concluding that, by enacting the INA,
Congress did not intend to completely restrict state power to regulate issues within state
power to regulate, even if state regulation of those issues impacts immigration policy).
151. Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
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It follows that "even state regulation designed to protect vital state inter-
ests must give way to paramount federal legislation.' 15 2
Prospective renters could assert causes of action against cities that im-
pose rental ban ordinances because rental ban ordinances will result in
blatant violations of the FHA and, consequently, city-adopted regulations
cannot be viewed as federally sanctioned.' 53 Findings of violations can
hinge on judicial determinations that minorities were disproportionately
affected by a racially motivated housing practice or policy.' 54
2. Theories of Disparate Treatment or Disparate Impact
Plaintiffs affected by discriminatory rental bans may find relief in one
of two ways: (1) plaintiffs can assert that a rental ban ordinance is inten-
tionally discriminatory; or (2) plaintiffs can allege that facially neutral leg-
islation gives rise to a disparate impact.' 55
In order to establish a violation of the FHA, a plaintiff must demon-
strate either disparate treatment or disparate impact. 156 A disparate im-
pact claim requires proof that the discriminatory impact resulted from
facially neutral legislation."5 7 This is likely to be the better claim for
plaintiffs affected by rental ban ordinances, as rental bans are not facially
discriminatory; rather, rental ban ordinances appear facially neutral. 1 58 It
may be inferred that "the ordinances will almost certainly have a dispa-
152. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357; cf. Alyssa Garcia Perez, Texas Rangers Resurrected:
Immigration Proposals After September l1th, 8 SCHOLAR 277, 290-91 (2006) (discussing
the factors that determine whether state regulatory laws preempt federal law).
153. See Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Fed-
eral Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Ac-
cess to Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 539 (2008) ("Any law that would
require or permit discriminatory housing practices is invalid under the [FHA]." (footnote
omitted)).
154. See Orange Lake Assocs. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1994)
(providing that housing practices are discriminatory under the FHA if minorities are af-
fected in greater numbers than White renters).
155. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER. AM-L. REV. 529, 540 (2008).
156. See Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04-CV-875, 2007 WL 2437810, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007) (providing an alternative theory on which plaintiffs can success-
fully bring claims under the FHA).
157. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER. AM-L. REV. 529, 540 (2008).
158. E.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinances 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), invalidated by Vil-
las at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfslimmigrants/farmersbranch ordinance.pdf.
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rate impact on both undocumented and documented immigrants in their
respective localities. 159
Conversely, however, a claim of outright or intentional discrimination
may be too high a burden of proof.16° The language of rental ban ordi-
nances, no matter where they are enacted, does not explicitly state that
property owners and landlords are to discriminate against, for example,
Latin Americans, Asians, African-Americans, or another particular racial
group.1 61 Proponents of rental bans claim that the ordinances do not
seek to discriminate against one particular race or national origin, but
rather seek only to prevent undocumented immigrants from infiltrating
the housing market.1 62 Arguably, it would be too difficult to prove blan-
ket discrimination from a reading of any given rental ban ordinance.
However, "if aggrieved plaintiffs can show that the ordinances permit
such discriminatory housing practices[,] they could attack them on such
grounds.' ' 163 But a fair reading of different cities' ordinances will show a
meritorious claim for discrimination that proceeds from a facially neutral
law, 164 and plaintiffs, therefore, should substantiate discrimination-based
claims on a theory of disparate impact.
Additionally, individuals facing discrimination when seeking to rent
property in cities with adopted rental bans will have an action in tort.
165
159. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 529, 540 (2008) (footnote omitted).
160. See id. at 539 ("[J]ust because the ordinances seem to provide a vehicle with
which landlords might act discriminately toward prospective tenants based on race and/or
national origin, does not mean that the localities intended such a consequence.").
161. E.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006) (containing no
facially discriminatory language).
162. E.g., Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047-48 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(designating "illegal aliens" as the only group targeted by the rental ban ordinance). The
City of Escondido argues that the purpose of the ordinance is to alleviate the blight in the
city's housing market. Id. at 1052-53. The plaintiffs, however, contend that "the study
used by [d]efendant to justify the [o]rdinance did not cite illegal immigrants as the source
of housing problems, but that the blight conditions in the [Escondido] area were due to the
high costs of housing and the unavailability of affordable subsidized housing in Escon-
dido." Id. at 1053.
163. Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 539 (2008).
164. E.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006).
165. See Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) ("An action
based upon the federal antidiscrimination statutes is essentially an action in tort."). The
Supreme Court has upheld tort claims stemming from violations of the FHA; in fact, the
Court has analogized discrimination suits with actions for the intentional infliction of
mental anguish and defamation. Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
Further, "the statutory ban on racial discrimination in housing 'could be viewed as an ex-
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Not only will property owners and landlords potentially face criminal
prosecution or financial sanctions by cities if they violate rental ban re-
quirements,166 but they will be civilly liable for upholding the bans as
well. 167 Property owners and landlords, therefore, will find themselves in
a state of legal limbo, uncertain of how to proceed.1 68
IV. CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that judicial scrutiny will affect future implementa-
tion of rental bans. The preservation and survival of rental bans will de-
pend entirely on how courts treat the hundreds of challenges to rental
ban ordinances that are being litigated throughout the country.1 69 Cities
that pass rental ban ordinances have recently found themselves in unset-
tled territory, as litigation on the issue of rental bans has become perva-
sive. State-enacted immigration reform is manifested by the adoption of
many different anti-immigration measures.170 As different cities in differ-
ent states enact their own policies to reduce the facilitation of illegal im-
tension of the common-law duty of innkeepers not to refuse temporary lodging to a trav-
eler without justification."' Id. (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195); see also Patterson v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976) (analogizing the scheme of compensation
for redress of racial employment discrimination to the scheme of compensation under tort
law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). "The analogy is apt because a statutory action
attacking racial discrimination is fundamental for the redress of a tort." Patterson, 535 F.2d
at 269 n.10 (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195).
166. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 763 (stating that the Farm-
ers Branch ordinance imposes fines and possible jail time for property owners who fail to
comply with the adopted rental ban).
167. See Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Fed-
eral Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Ac-
cess to Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 539 (2008) (claiming that these
landlords may be liable for discriminatory conduct under the FHA).
168. See Sophie Marie Alcorn, Note, Landlords Beware, You May Be Renting Your
Own Room... in Jail: Landlords Should Not Be Prosecuted for Harboring Aliens, 7 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 289, 293, 304-05 (2008) (contrasting penalties for failing to
comply with rental bans with penalties for discriminating in violation of the FHA).
169. See Clifton R. Gruhn, Comment, Filling Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Fed-
eral Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants' Ac-
cess to Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 529, 556-57 (2008) (stating that "the
issues presented by [rental bans and similar state anti-immigration laws] are far from set-
tied"); see also Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at A22, available at 2008 WLNR 2574286 (discussing how the varied
decisions around the country on this issue have created a conflict of laws between the
states).
170. E.g., Nchimunya D. Ndulo, Note, State Employer Sanctions Laws and the Federal
Preemption Doctrine: The Legal Arizona Workers Act Revisited, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 849, 852 (2009) (analyzing the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which bans Arizona
employers from hiring undocumented immigrants).
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migration, there is still no clear legal guidance for enforcement. 7' One
could argue that some deference should be given to city and state ordi-
nances because of the existing relationship between national security and
illegal immigration.172 It has been argued that the mere fact that local
enactments concern illegal immigration does not signify a local attempt to
regulate immigration, as local enactments and policies do not set parame-
ters for which immigrants may remain in the United States.1 73
This Note highlights the fact that cities that pass rental ban ordinances
are not immune from suits based on viable constitutional claims. A city's
or municipality's claim of sovereignty is rendered obsolete if the city or
"municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue." '174 Ar-
guably, plaintiffs can successfully abrogate sovereignty claims, as well as
municipalities' qualified immunity claims, by showing that a rental ban
ordinance is discriminatory on its face or is affirmatively linked to a dis-
parate impact.175
171. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (2008) (stating that courts are not reaching consistent conclu-
sions on local immigration enactments).
172. See id. at 806 ("Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government
has actively sought the law enforcement assistance of states and localities." (footnote
omitted)); c.f. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (noting that the
immigration issue is characterized by a perpetual tug-of-war between state and federal
powers). "It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or
by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the [s]tates
undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31
(citation omitted); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 455 (1937) (asserting that where
there is a conflict between state and federal power, the conflict may be resolved based on a
standard of uniformity and consistency between the state and federal statutes); Simpson v.
Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913) (maintaining that when
Congress acts, its laws override those of the individual states).
[The] reservation to the states manifestly is only of that authority which is consistent
with, and not opposed to, the grant to Congress. There is no room in our scheme of
government for the assertion of state power in hostility to the authorized exercise of
[f]ederal power. The authority of Congress extends to every part of interstate com-
merce and to every instrumentality or agency by which it is carried on; and the full
control by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to be denied or
thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations.
Simpson, 230 U.S. at 399.
173. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (defining "regulation of immigra-
tion" as setting conditions for immigrants to remain in the country).
174. Burnett v. Sharma, 511 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
175. See Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04-CV-875, 2007 WL 2437810, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007) (stating that disparate impact is legitimate grounds for suit under
the FHA).
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Individuals negatively affected by rental ban ordinances undoubtedly
have legitimate constitutional claims.176 This issue is in the early stages of
resolution and is evolving within a legal context. Plaintiffs seeking to
quash local rental bans have been preliminarily successful in obtaining
injunctions and temporary or permanent restraining orders against en-
forcement. 177 But despite this precursory success, this issue will continue
to inspire controversy, as it is an issue that affects many individuals, in-
cluding both citizens of the United States and undocumented immigrants.
As an example of this preliminary success, the court in Villas at Park-
side Partners v. City of Farmers Branch found the Farmers Branch ordi-
nance preempted because it constituted a "regulation of immigration.,
178
The absolute designation of the ordinance as a regulation of immigration
serves as a strong foundation for decisions in future lawsuits. Arguably,
however, the future remains unclear, as other courts may hold that immi-
gration ordinances do not attempt to regulate immigration. As a result,
the Villas at Parkside Partners decision can in no way be interpreted as
judicial precedent.
This Note does not seek to predict a legal outcome for rental ban ordi-
nances, but rather attempts to bring to light potential claims that may
develop or evolve from rental ban adoption. The establishment and actu-
alization of rental ban ordinances invites litigation in many different ar-
eas of law; clearly, litigation is not limited to the issue of discrimination
based on constitutionally protected traits. When brought to fruition, legal
claims could conceivably encompass causes of action stemming from
property-related interests, such as an ordinance's resultant restraint on
alienation of property. Plaintiffs seeking to challenge rental bans in their
cities should not stop with asserting only constitutional claims of discrimi-
nation, but should pursue the issue from a property approach as well.
Adjudication on the merits could potentially result in a finding that prop-
erty owners have been prevented from the effective use, enjoyment, and
disposal of their property. Thus, cities cannot effectively defend their
rental bans without incurring some liability. Plaintiffs should espouse
their rights as property owners and seek adjudication on the merits of this
issue. Other plaintiffs, such as prospective tenants, could prevail on
176. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d
757, 776 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (authorizing the granting of an injunction against enforcement of
the Farmers Branch rental ban).
177. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 542, 545-46 (M.D. Pa.
2007); Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 777; Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465
F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
178. Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
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claims under the FHA with allegations of systematic discrimination based
on race, ethnicity, or national origin.'79
Only time will tell whether rental ban ordinances will survive judicial
scrutiny; however, one can infer that judicial inquiry will be intense and
lengthy, as this issue will assume national proportions due to the widely
held belief that cities and states must continue to enact legislation to curb
illegal immigration.' S° Local immigration measures calculated to curb il-
legal immigration are sure to continue. 8' It is likely that cities will re-
vamp rental ban ordinances absent federal reform. Federal legislation
has never specifically undertaken reform on certain local immigration or-
dinances, such as rental bans, and it is unlikely that this issue will be miti-
gated or resolved merely by temporary injunctions or restraining orders;
however, "a temporary restraining order, though not ultimately determi-
native on the merits, is an important step.' 182 Mere censure of city rental
ban ordinances is not an adequate remedy for the larger issue.
Carefully drafted legislation is necessary to curtail the conflict plaguing
America's cities. If municipalities are to continue to act as extensions of
state power, states must diligently draft future statutes to be as compara-
ble to federal law as possible; to do otherwise will undoubtedly result in
claims of federal preemption. 183 Conceivably, there will be division and
conflict as to what amounts to proper immigration reform in the immedi-
ate future. Immigration issues run so deep that anti-immigrant ordi-
nances will likely remain a serious point of contention absent
179. See Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
180. See Gretel C. Kovach, Voters in Dallas Suburb Back Limit on Renting to Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007, at 120, available at 2007 WLNR 9058926 (echoing
the notion that litigation will be lengthy). Supporters of rental bans in Farmers Branch, for
example, are not opposed to litigating the issue up to the Supreme Court. Id. Their party-
opposition, however, maintains the same stance. Id.
181. See Stephanie Sandoval, New Mayor Says Top Priority Is Ridding Carrollton of
Illegal Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEws, May 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
8902450 (suggesting that the adoption of rental bans will continue absent unequivocal judi-
cial decisions).
182. L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting the Freedom of Undocumented Immi-
grants as Violations of Equal Protection and Principles of Federal Preemption, 52 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 479, 497 (2008) (footnote omitted).
183. See Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should
Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464 (2008) ("[T]here is wide
latitude for states and municipalities to act without being preempted, provided the statutes
are drafted correctly."). Three significant restrictions must be taken into account with
state statutes and city ordinances to avoid preemption. Id. at 465. The statute or ordi-
nance must not create a category of aliens that is not currently recognized by federal law,
use language and terminology that is inconsistent with federal law, or contain any attempt
to allow non-federal authorities to determine, independently and without authorization by
the federal government, the immigration status of an individual. Id.
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unambiguous and clear-cut federal reform. Without such reform, there
remains the possibility of the evolution of a "patchwork of divergent
laws." '184 At the same time, however, in accordance with federal preemp-
tion standards, states will be acting in harmony with federal laws, so long
as there remains no uniform law as to locality-based immigration rental
ordinances.185 But with respect to federal anti-discrimination laws, such
as the FHA, municipalities and property owners remain amenable to
suit.
186
Cities across the country are taking divergent approaches to the issue
of immigration reform. Some cities, such as those that adopt rental ban
ordinances, take a punitive approach to illegal presence. The establish-
ment of rental bans in cities across the country is an attempt to curb ille-
gal immigration within city borders. Other cities, however, seek
immigration reform through a more accepting and liberalized approach.
This liberal approach is exemplified by the creation of "sanctuary cit-
ies."'18 7 No matter which approach a city adopts, both are attempts at
immigration reform. These divergent legislative strategies highlight the
polarization of the immigration debate that is being waged in cities across
the United States. One perspective is often interpreted as openly hostile
and punitive, the other as liberal and undermining the historically proper
channels for immigration to the United States. 88 Although this Note fo-
184. Id. at 483.
185. Id. at 469 (contending that there is no real divergence between federal and state
laws when state legislatures enact immigration legislation).
186. See Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006) (articulating grounds
of discrimination).
187. See Michael Luo, A Closer Look at the 'Sanctuary City' Argument, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2007, at A26, available at 2007 WLNR 23527581 (analyzing the establishment of
sanctuary cities for undocumented immigrants across the United States); Michele Wucker,
A Safe Haven in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at 15, available at 2007 WLNR
7152133 (noting that some cities across the country have welcomed and embraced undocu-
mented workers). "Sanctuary cities" are described by opponents as "cities that turn a
blind eye to federal immigration law." Michael Luo, A Closer Look at the 'Sanctuary City'
Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at A26, available at 2007 WLNR 23527581. Cities
that adopt these "don't ask, don't tell" policies, like New Haven, Connecticut, argue that
"bringing undocumented residents out of the shadows benefits everyone." Michele
Wucker, A Safe Haven in New Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at 15, available at 2007
WLNR 7152133.
188. Michael Luo, Walking a Tightrope on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at
41, available at 2007 WLNR 22824057. Cities that promote themselves as sanctuary cities
are often designated as more liberal because they undertake the immigration issue from an
accommodation approach, as opposed to a hostile and punitive approach to illegal immi-
gration. Id. During the Republican primaries in 2007 and 2008, most of the candidates
spoke out against sanctuary cities and amnesty as part of their platforms on illegal immi-
gration. Id. But the rising number of Hispanic voters forced candidates to tone down their
anti-immigrant rhetoric. Id.
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cuses on rental ban ordinances, the contrast between cities that impose
strict immigration ordinances and cities that abstain from imposing any
sort of legislation (sanctuary cities) highlights the point that the immigra-
tion issue is not easily resolved. Until there is a uniform system of immi-
gration reform, or some consistency between federal and state
immigration laws that will prevent cities from adopting their own mea-
sures, rental ban ordinances will continue to be placed on city ballots.
For this reason, individuals affected by rental ban ordinances, both
property owners and prospective tenants alike, should be aware of the
potential for lawsuits. Absent judicial resolution or federal reform, rights
will be suspended in the alleged interest of local police power.

